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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD 
ALBERTO G. ARAIZA1 
ABSTRACT 
Cloud Computing is poised to offer tremendous benefits to 
clients, including inexpensive access to seemingly limitless 
resources that are available instantly, anywhere.  To prepare for 
the shift from computing environments dependent on dedicated 
hardware to Cloud Computing, the Federal Rules of Discovery 
should be amended to provide relevant guidelines and exceptions 
for particular types of shared data.  Meanwhile, clients should 
ensure that service contracts with Cloud providers include 
safeguards against inadvertent discoveries and mechanisms for 
complying with the Rules.  Without these adaptations, clients will 
be either reluctant or unprepared to adopt Cloud Computing 
services, and forgo their benefits. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The conventional use of personal computers is evolving as shared 
computing becomes mainstream.2  A type of shared computing called 
“Cloud Computing” stores client data and applications in shared data 
centers around the world3 so that clients can access their data or run 
applications from any location with an Internet connection.4  A Cloud 
provider can offer access to seemingly unlimited applications, operating 
systems, and hardware as services of the Cloud.5 
                                                      
1 Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected, 2012; Tulane University 
School of Science and Engineering, M.E. in Biomedical Engineering; UCLA 
Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied Science, B.S. in Electrical 
Engineering.  I would like to thank Professor Jeremy Mullem for his guidance in 
the writing of this iBrief. 
2 See Chris Weitz, Cloud Computing and the New Normal, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Nov. 8, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9195468. 
3 See Complaint of Electronic Privacy Information Center at 4, In re Google, 
Inc. & Cloud Computing Servs. (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 2009) (“[A]pplications reside 
on third party servers, managed by private firms, that provide remote access 
through web-based devices.”), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf. 
4 David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment 
Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 2205, 2216 (2009). 
5 See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 2 (Oct. 7, 2009), 
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¶2 Cloud Computing is becoming very popular with a broad base of 
consumers.  Websites such as Facebook turn personal computers into 
portals for clients to access and share images, videos, and text online.6  In 
December 2010, Google unveiled its Cloud-based notebook, and 
commentators noted “there are several things worth raving about. . . . The 
machine starts up fast, snaps to life in an instant from sleep mode and has 
superb battery life. . . . [A]ll your apps, documents, settings and then some 
will be securely housed in the cloud.”7 
¶3 Cloud Computing is also becoming popular with businesses and 
public organizations.  These entities are beginning to use Cloud Computing 
because it can reduce the need for IT floor space by 80% and save 60% on 
power costs, while tripling usage of IT assets.8  Cloud Computing also 
allows clients to penetrate the marketplace with relative ease because it 
requires less capital than would be invested in traditional location-
dependent hardware.9  It is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to growth and 
usage spikes.10  New business models may emerge where using Cloud 
Computing is essential to remain competitive in the marketplace.11 
¶4  The introduction of Cloud Computing to a variety of industries has 
presented new complexities in the discovery phase of litigation.  Pretrial 
discovery procedures involve delineating the scope of discoverable 
electronically stored information (ESI) as potentially leading to relevant 
evidence.12  In Cloud Computing, shared data centers housing ESI are 
central to discovery.  Although the Federal Rules of Discovery (Rules) were 
                                                                                                                         
www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/cloud-def-v15.pdf; see also Jonathan Strickland, 
How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing1.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2010). 
6 FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
7 Edward C. Baig, Google Chromebook: Much to Rave About at First Look, 
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwardbaig/2010-12-16-
baig16_ST_N.htm?csp=hf (last updated Dec. 16, 2010). 
8 Andrew C. DeVore, Cloud Computing: Privacy Storm on the Horizon?, 20 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 365, 367–68 (2010) (noting the federal government will 
push out data dramatically into the Cloud); see also The Benefits of Cloud 
Computing: A New Era of Responsiveness, Effectiveness, and Efficiency in IT 
Service Delivery, IBM (July 2009), 
ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/en/diw03004usen/DIW03004USEN.
PDF. 
9 See Weitz, supra note 2. 
10 Id. 
11 See, e.g., DeVore, supra note 8, at 368 (“[M]ajor providers [Microsoft and 
Google] recognize that this may well be the future of computing, particularly in 
the corporate world.”). 
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
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designed with an inherent flexibility and applicability to technological 
developments in personal computing,13 they cannot effectively be adapted 
to the Cloud Computing context.   
¶5 Discovering ESI in a Cloud, where clients share resources, is 
complex for two significant reasons.  First, Cloud Computing puts client 
data under the control of a third-party Cloud provider.  Rule 34(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a party may serve a request to 
produce ESI in the responding party’s “possession, custody, or control.”14  
These criteria are vague, and as a result of a third party’s control over a 
client’s data, key evidence residing in a Cloud may be outside the scope of 
discovery.  Second, because Cloud Computing services deal with a large 
number of clients and may intermingle clients’ resources, isolating or 
retrieving the physical storage medium of one client’s data in a lawsuit may 
adversely affect other clients who are not involved in the litigation.  
¶6 The Rules are not flexible enough to encompass the technological 
paradigm shift to Cloud Computing.  Specifically, the Rules do not provide 
guidelines for the production, preservation, and spoliation of ESI in a shared 
environment.  This problem may be mitigated through technological means 
or by changing the Rules.  Further, negotiating the terms of a contractual 
relationship between a Cloud provider and client may provide sufficient 
protection for both parties.  Clients should consider whether their service 
contracts include sufficient safeguards against inadvertent discoveries of 
data, accurate indications of costs, and mechanisms for complying with the 
Rules. 
I. THE FUTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
A. Technical Features 
¶7 The phrase “Cloud Computing,” under which the decentralized 
service is marketed, suggests that it is user-friendly and strips away any 
semblance of complexity from the minds of consumers.15  The service, 
though intangible and novel, is extremely accessible, and the underlying 
                                                      
13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note. 
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
15 See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199–1200 
(2010) (“This structure closely resembles the early mainframe computing 
model; instead of a ‘dumb terminal’ designed solely to access a mainframe’s 
resources, the personal computer is beginning to serve as a ‘dumb terminal’ to 
access cloud computing’s resources via the Internet.”). 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 008 
technology of Cloud Computing encompasses several familiar technologies, 
collectively deployed in new ways.16   
¶8 Cloud providers essentially virtualize the same physical resources 
(such as processors and storage servers) to service multiple dispersed 
clients.17  Cloud providers also divide “the tasks of running applications and 
storing data into small chunks,” and then allocate the chunks among various 
distributed resources.18  These resources are dynamically partitioned 
according to client demand.19  That is, computing resources are divided 
according to what clients need, when they need them.  Thus, one benefit 
includes maximizing access to seemingly limitless computing resources. 
¶9 Familiar computer applications are making their way into the 
Cloud, arguably increasing the productivity of their users.  Early email 
services relied on applications residing on storage devices contained in 
personal computers, but localized email is increasingly migrating to 
webmail.20  Webmail resides in remote data centers shared by clients, and is 
accessible from anywhere, over the Internet.21  Productivity software, such 
as Microsoft Office, is also shifting into the Cloud.22  Pushing its Office 
suite into the Cloud allowed Microsoft to compete with Google Docs, 
which was released in 2007 and has always resided in the Cloud. 23 
                                                      
16 Id. 
17 Tyrone Grandison et al., Towards a Formal Definition of a Computing Cloud, 
2010 IEEE 6TH WORLD CONGRESS ON SERVICES 191. 
18 See Robison, supra note 15. 
19 Mell & Grance, supra note 5, at 1. 
20 See George Jiang, Note, Rain or Shine: Fair and Other Non-Infringing Uses 
in the Context of Cloud Computing, 36 J. LEGIS. 395, 413 (2010) (“A number of 
public cloud applications are already available for tasks such as word 
processing, e-mail, video storage and playback, and data storage.”). 
21 See Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 5 (2008) (“Computing power was first highly 
centralized with mainframes, and then decentralized through the switch to 
minicomputers and PCs. With the cloud, content and computing power will 
increasingly be managed centrally.”). 
22 See, e.g., Microsoft Web Apps: Office Goes to the Web, MICROSOFT NEWS 
CENTER (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2009/sep09/09-
17officewebapps.mspx (“Our mission with the upcoming release of Microsoft 
Office 2010 is to deliver a great productivity experience . . . . With Office Web 
Apps people can access, share and work on Office documents from virtually 
anywhere with an Internet connection.”).  
23 See Ian Paul, Microsoft Office vs. Google Docs: A Web Apps Showdown, 
PCWORLD (Jul. 13, 2009, 9:50 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/168309 
(“[Microsoft] unveiled as a part of Office 2010 a suite of Microsoft Office Web 
apps that will compete directly with Google Docs.”); see also Kevin Cross et al., 
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¶10 Cloud services make it possible to share resources located 
throughout the world.24  For example, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and 
Google have contemplated placing data centers in Siberia, abandoned 
coalmines, and on ships at sea, respectively.25  Interestingly, Google 
acquired a patent for placing data centers on ships to obtain power from the 
“natural motion of the water” and to use seawater to carry heat away.26  
Placing data centers in unusual locations may make Cloud Computing even 
more appealing because of the technical benefits of using the natural 
environment to power the data centers and to control their temperatures. 
B. Economic Benefits 
¶11 Analysts predict that 9% of all IT consumer spending will be for 
Cloud Computing services by 2012, which reflects a doubling of demand 
from 2008.27  Cloud Computing offers businesses lower costs and 
accommodates growth with dynamic access to resources and flexible 
purchasing plans.28  The cost benefit of outsourcing while maintaining 
instant and seemingly unlimited access to computing resources will provide 
businesses with a competitive edge.29  Cloud providers, such as Amazon, 
Google, and Microsoft, only charge about $0.10 per hour for basic 
                                                                                                                         
Google Docs, WEB 2.0 TOOLS – NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR TEACHING AND 
LEARNING (July 8, 2010), 
https://wiki.itap.purdue.edu/display/INSITE/Google+Docs#GoogleDocs-what 
(“Beginning in February 2007 all Google users had were allowed access to 
Google Docs, which has many of the same abilities as MS Word or 
Openoffice.org Writer.”). 
24 See DeVore, supra note 8 (“[C]ompanies are very interested in having 
services that make it easy for workers across the organization and across the 
world to use those services collaboratively.”). 
25 Murad Ahmed, Google Search Finds Seafaring Solution, THE TIMES, Sept. 
15, 2008, 
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article4753
389.ece; see U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007). 
26 U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 col.2 l.27–31 (filed Feb. 26, 2007). 
27 Frank Gens, IT Cloud Services Forecast – 2008, 2012: A Key Driver of New 
Growth, IDC EXCHANGE (Oct. 8, 2008), http://blogs.idc.com/ie/?p=224.  
28 See Jiang, supra note 20 (“[C]loud service providers have control over the 
content that they make available and can monitor usage statistics. . . . These 
attributes provide different access plans, such as the pay-per-use model or an ad-
supported free access model.”). 
29 See DeVore, supra note 8 (“Cloud computing also offers potentially 
significant advantages with regard to cost savings and efficiency.”); see also 
Weitz, supra note 2 (“Growth of cloud computing adoption is indeed rapid when 
the price of entry approaches zero for the smallest subscribers.”). 
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processing requests.30  Some analysts predict that these costs will soon 
decline by 5% to 20%.31  These benefits allow businesses to “be competitive 
and to react faster to the market demands.”32 
C. The Legal Implications 
¶12 Although sharing resources produces positive externalities, it also 
gives rise to many legal issues.  For example, the data in data centers may 
be subject to foreign laws or no laws at all.33  Cloud providers may also 
limit the control a business has over data it places in a Cloud.34  These 
factors will complicate a client’s effort to defend itself against discovery 
requests.  
¶13 Attorneys recommend that their clients “have [a] clear 
understanding of what [a] cloud provider will do in response to legal 
requests for information” and “[n]egotiate roles for response to [electronic] 
discovery requests.”35  Clients should “[u]nderstand and negotiate where 
[their] data will be stored, what law controls and possible restrictions on 
cross-border transfers.”36  Unfortunately, such advice may fail to reach the 
                                                      
30 Udayan Banerjee, Cloud Economics – A Platform Comparison, UDAYAN 
BANERJEE'S BLOG – FROM THE OTHER SIDE (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:12 PM), 
http://setandbma.wordpress.com/2010/01/21/cloud-economics-a-platform-
comparison. 
31 See, e.g., Rachel Lebeaux, What’s Behind Declining Prices for Application 
Hosting Services, TOTALCIO (Apr. 3, 2009, 1:45 PM), 
http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/total-cio/what’s-behind-declining-
prices-for-application-hosting-services (“[A]nalyst firm Gartner Inc. predicts 
that the cost of outsourcing IT infrastructure will decrease 5% to 20% during the 
next two years.”). 
32 Giuseppe Minutoli et al., Virtual Business Networks with Cloud Computing 
and Virtual Machines, INT’L CONF. ON ULTRA MODERN TELECOMM. & 
WORKSHOPS, Oct. 2009, at 1, available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5345440. 
33 See Paul T. Jaeger et al., Where is the Cloud? Geography, Economics, 
Environment, and Jurisdiction in Cloud Computing, 14 FIRST MONDAY 5 
(2009), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/24
56/2171 (“The laws of any nation where a data center is located will apply, and 
many nations do not have nearly the civil rights safeguards that the United 
States does.”). 
34 Jiang, supra note 20. 
35 Laurin H. Mills, Legal Issues Associated with Cloud Computing, NIXON 
PEABODY, 16, 21 (2009),  
http://www.secureit.com/resources/Cloud%20Computing%20Mills%20Nixon%
20Peabody%205-09.pdf. 
36 Id. at 22. 
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masses of inexperienced clients using Cloud services, who do not know 
what to anticipate during litigation.   
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY  
¶14 Electronic discovery is “any process in which electronic data is 
sought, located, [and] secured, with the intent of using it as evidence in a 
civil or criminal legal case.”37 
A. Electronically Stored Information  
¶15 The Rules state that “a party must . . . provide to other parties . . . a 
copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in the 
possession, custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party 
may use to support its claims or defenses.”38  A party may request the 
production of ESI “in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control 
. . . stored in any medium from which information can be obtained.”39   A 
party does not have to provide discovery of ESI “from sources that the party 
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”40  
The use of the phrase “electronically stored information” was “intended to 
be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based information, 
and flexible enough to encompass future changes and developments.”41 
B. Discovery of Metadata 
¶16 Metadata is a type of discoverable ESI.42  Metadata is information 
attached to the data it describes, which may include a user name, comments, 
document versions, the names of servers storing saved data, and the like.43  
Another form of metadata is “tagging, which gives you the ability to 
                                                      
37 Stephen Biggs & Stilianos Vidalis, Cloud Computing: The Impact on Digital 
Forensic Investigations, INT’L CONF. FOR INTERNET TECH. & SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS, Nov. 2009, at 2, available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=5402561.  
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
40 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note. 
42 See Charles R. Ragan et al. eds., The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice & 
Commentary for Managing Information & Records in the Electronic Age, 
SEDONA CONF. WORKING GROUP SERIES, 13, 29–30 (Sept. 2005), 
http://www.sedonaconference.com/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf. 
43 Find and Remove Metadata (Hidden Information) in Your Legal Documents, 
WORD HELP AND HOW-TO, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/word-help/find-
and-remove-metadata-hidden-information-in-your-legal-documents-
HA001077646.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
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identify and reference people in photos, videos and notes.”44  The Rules 
state that metadata “may be among the topics discussed in the Rule 26(f) 
[pretrial] conference,”45 but the Rules Advisory Committee’s description of 
metadata does not offer much guidance for targeting such information 
through discovery:  
Computer programs may retain draft language, editorial comments, 
and other deleted matter (sometimes referred to as “embedded data” or 
“embedded edits”) in an electronic file but not make them apparent to 
the reader.  Information describing the history, tracking, or 
management of an electronic file (sometimes called “metadata”) is 
usually not apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a screen 
image.46 
¶17 The lack of direction from the Rules is troubling because computer 
programs routinely generate metadata and such data may be crucial in 
litigation.47  Operating systems “enrich files with metadata” to improve 
search and organization capabilities,48 and metadata has already proven to 
serve as key evidence in some trials.49 
¶18   Although the Rules suggest the production of metadata absent an 
affirmative showing of need should be denied,50 federal courts have 
attempted to devise frameworks for compelling its production.51  In 
                                                      
44 Tom Occhino, Tag Friends in Your Status and Posts, THE FACEBOOK BLOG 
(Sept. 10, 2009, 3:01 PM), 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=109765592130.  
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note. 
46 See id. 
47 See Scott Nagel, Embedded Information in Electronic Documents: Why 
Metadata Matters, LAW PRACTICE TODAY (July 2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr07044.html; see also Damian Vargas, 
Note & Comment, Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 398–99 
(2008). 
48 Windows Vista metadata, VISION (Jan. 2006), 
http://www.lcbridge.nl/vision/vistametadata.htm.  
49 See, e.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., LLC, No. 05-C-3003, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31669, at *26–31 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (entering a default 
judgment against a former employee for breach of a restrictive covenant based 
on metadata showing the employee had deleted and altered thousands of files). 
50 Shannon M. Curreri, Note, Developments in the Law: II. Defining 
“Document” in the Digital Landscape of Electronic Discovery, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1541, 1548 (noting that a prior draft of the advisory committee note quoted 
the Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 11.446 that “production requests 
seeking files with all associated meta data ‘should be conditioned upon a 
showing of need or sharing expenses.’”). 
51 See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005). 
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Williams v. Sprint/United Management, a federal district judge interpreted 
the phrase “[a] party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual 
course of business” in Rule 34(b)52 to mean electronic files “with their 
metadata intact.”53  It was further ruled that metadata is to be produced even 
if it is not explicitly part of a request for production.54   
¶19 Transient data, including metadata, may constitute discoverable 
ESI.  For example, in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court ruled 
that data stored on RAM constitutes ESI.55  The court held that RAM data is 
“‘stored’ [information] under the plain meaning of the unambiguous 
language of Rule 34.”56  Therefore, even metadata that is temporarily stored 
may constitute ESI.   
C. The Duty to Preserve 
¶20 There is generally no duty to preserve documents, but a 
“preservation obligation may arise from many sources, including common 
law, statutes, regulations, or a court order . . . in the case.”57  A “litigation 
hold” is a notice to a party that triggers the preservation of ESI by requiring 
“intervention in the routine operation of an information system” to suspend 
the normal destruction of material.58  The duty to preserve may also arise 
without notice when litigation is “reasonably anticipated.”59 
¶21 Under a good faith requirement, a party is “not permitted to exploit 
the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery 
obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy 
specific stored information that it is required to preserve.”60  Litigants may 
separate out ESI (by transferring ESI to another storage device) to comply 
with the retention and access requirements of discovery and to avoid 
sanctions for spoliation. 
                                                      
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b). 
53 See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 653–54. 
54 Id. 
55 245 F.R.D. 443, 447 (C.D. Cal. 2007); but see Vargas, supra note 47, at 410 
(“RAM is not used to store or record data. . . . Data processed in RAM is 
constantly overwritten.”). 
56 Columbia Pictures, Inc., 245 F.R.D. at 447. 
57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 287 (E.D. Va. 
2001) (“[I]f a party has notice (by discovery request, by the provisions of a rule 
regarding disclosure, or otherwise) . . . , that party is under a duty not to take 
actions that would result in the destruction of the evidence.”). 
60 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s 
note. 
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D. Spoliation 
¶22 Spoliation is the deliberate or inadvertent loss, modification, or 
destruction of evidence by a party on notice of litigation who failed to take 
appropriate steps to preserve data.61  A popular test applied by federal courts 
to determine when sanctions for spoliation should apply requires showing 
that a spoliator had a duty to preserve, a culpable state of mind, and that the 
destroyed evidence was relevant to a party’s claims or defenses.62  The 
required level of culpability varies between courts.63  For example, the 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits require intentional misconduct or bad faith, but 
the Second Circuit held that “neither bad faith nor intentional misconduct is 
required.”64  Some scholars claim that imposing sanctions for spoliation is 
necessary because failing to preserve evidence not only “prevents a party 
from adequately proving or defending a claim at trial” but also “undermines 
the efficacy of the adversarial system.”65  
¶23 Applying these spoliation tests to Cloud Computing may prove to 
be difficult, and therefore must be adapted to this new context.  Notably, the 
Rules state, “the ordinary operation of computer systems creates a risk that 
a party may lose potentially discoverable information without culpable 
conduct on its part.”66  Further, “absent exceptional circumstances, 
sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of electronically stored information 
resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information 
system.”67  Thus, litigants may be unsure how they are supposed to 
harmonize the Rules with federal appellate court tests. 
III. DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD  
¶24 The Rules require litigants to “discuss any issues about preserving 
discoverable information[] and develop a proposed discovery plan” during a 
pretrial conference.68  Litigants must discuss discovery issues unique to 
Cloud Computing to “reduce prices and resolve potential complications 
early in litigation.”69  These requirements create “an affirmative duty on 
outside counsel to investigate the document retention policies of their 
                                                      
61 See Vargas, supra note 47, at 406. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 408. 
65 James T. Killelea, Note, Spoliation of Evidence: Proposals for New York 
State, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2005). 
66 FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note. 
67 Id. 
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
69 See Lauren Katz, Note, Current Development 2008-2009: A Balancing Act: 
Ethical Dilemmas in Retaining E-Discovery Consultants, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 929, 934 (2009). 
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clients during the earliest stages of representation”70 and place “a high 
burden of technical knowledge on attorneys.”71   
¶25 Clients rightfully fear adverse discovery of their ESI.72  For 
example, if third parties get access to trade secret information stored in a 
Cloud through discovery, “that could destroy the legal protection of trade 
secrets.”73  The Rules are “expansive and include[] any type of information 
that is stored electronically.”74   
¶26 Discovering ESI in the Cloud may also create liabilities for clients 
of the Cloud by inadvertently retrieving ESI belonging to other clients.  For 
example, a sector isolated from a shared storage medium may contain data 
from other Cloud clients.  This data shared among clients of a Cloud is 
discoverable because it is “fixed in a tangible form” and “stored in a 
medium from which it can be retrieved and examined.”75  Although major 
Cloud providers may include safeguards to ensure security and privacy, an 
increasing demand for Cloud services may spawn discount providers 
offering fewer safeguards against the unintentional disclosure of other 
clients’ data. 
¶27 Storing ESI in the Cloud may also provide litigants with loopholes 
to avoid divulging certain information.  Multiple layers of data are 
generated by various clients and managed by Cloud providers, and such ESI 
may not be in the possession, custody or control of the litigant.76  The data 
layers may include client-specific data, client-specific metadata, and 
metadata common to several clients,77 which may be unique to an 
application, generated by multiple clients, or stored in a shared repository.78  
Common metadata may be maintained in repositories shared between 
clients, which makes it a “major problem” to “isolate [that] data and 
maintain the security.”79  Therefore, that data may not be in the possession, 
                                                      
70 Joseph Gallagher, Note, E-Ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic 
Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 613, 617 (2007). 
71 Katz, supra note 69. 
72 See Vargas, supra note 47, at 405; see also Mills, supra note 35, at 17. 
73 Mills, supra note 35, at 17. 
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note. 
75 Id. 
76 Bhaskar Prasad Rimal & Mohamed A. El-Refaey, A Framework of Scientific 
Workflow Management Systems for Multi-Tenant Cloud Orchestration 
Environment, 2010 WORKSHOPS ON ENABLING TECHS.: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR 
COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISES 88, 90 (2010) [hereinafter Multi-Tenant Cloud 
Orchestration Environment]. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. 
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custody or control of a litigant, and thus not subject to discovery.  
Consequently, applying the Rules to a Cloud may create liabilities for 
clients of a Cloud and loopholes for litigants.  
A. Sharing Resources and Metadata 
¶28 Inadvertently producing or preserving ESI belonging to other 
clients of a Cloud is likely to have significant repercussions.  For example, 
“in many jurisdictions, inadvertent production of privileged data constitutes 
a waiver of privilege.”80  In Marrero-Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 
an “errant mouse click” led to the inadvertent production of “approximately 
1500 potentially privileged documents” that merged with unprivileged 
documents.81  Although the defendant claimed the documents were 
privileged,82 the court stated that if parties “opt to use technological 
resources to store privileged information, they should also provide the 
necessary protection for precisely that information.”83  
¶29 Further, allowing parties to discover common metadata in a Cloud 
is problematic.  The Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co. court held 
that “the producing party should produce the electronic documents with 
their metadata intact.”84  A party may move for a protective order when 
asked to produce metadata if it is “not reasonably accessible” and will result 
in “undue burden and cost.”85  However, common metadata may be readily 
accessible without undue burden or cost because it is stored in a common 
repository, yet its discovery may harm other clients.86  If, however, courts 
grant protective orders to protect those other parties, they may incentivize 
clients to “hide” their information as common metadata in the Cloud.  If 
courts do not grant protective orders, then discovery will reveal the common 
metadata, possibly disclosing private information about third parties.   
¶30 Requiring the production of metadata attached to documents is 
particularly troubling because Cloud metadata is increasingly inseparable 
among clients.87  Multiple Cloud providers may share metadata in an 
                                                      
80 Vargas, supra note 47, at 405; see ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE 7–21 (2007). 
81 No. 03-1485, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47738, at *6 (D.P.R. July 11, 2006). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *15. 
84 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. Kan. 2005). 
85 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), 26(c). 
86 See Multi-Tenant Cloud Orchestration Environment, supra note 76. 
87 Lori MacVittie, Who Owns Application Delivery Meta-data in the Cloud?, 
DEVCENTRAL WEBLOG (Feb. 6, 2009, 4:39 AM), 
http://devcentral.f5.com/weblogs/macvittie/archive/2009/02/06/who-owns-
application-delivery-meta-data-in-the-cloud.aspx [hereinafter Who Owns 
Metadata]. 
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architecture optimized for interoperability and portability.88  Interoperability 
is the ability to exchange and use client data between different Cloud 
providers, and portability is the ability to deliver data anywhere on 
demand.89  If Cloud providers were forced to change their delivery and 
security policies to maintain these two functions, then clients may lose 
metadata or lose control over copies of metadata residing in multiple data 
centers.90  For example, metadata generated by one Cloud provider may be 
inadvertently lost when a client accesses the same metadata through a 
second provider.91 
B. Preserving Client Data 
¶31 The duty to preserve ESI under an ongoing litigation hold conflicts 
with the “real advantage” of Cloud Computing, which is to increase 
“flexibility and responsiveness” of shared resources among clients.92  For 
example, Cloud Computing dynamically allocates virtual storage volumes 
to clients, which may comprise multiple physical storage volumes 
partitioned according to client demand.93  ESI from a single client can 
therefore be stored across multiple physical storage volumes, wherever 
there is available capacity.94  Thus, preserving (or saving) ESI detracts from 
the elasticity of resources for other clients who may have a demand for the 
same resources.95   
¶32 Implementing preservation techniques may require isolating Cloud 
resources, which can cause performance degradation for other clients 
because they are forbidden access to the same resources.96  Further, a Cloud 
provider may isolate physical resources, rather than virtual ones, to ensure 
full compliance with the Rules.  Isolating a physical resource may preserve 
data belonging to multiple clients who share that same physical resource; 
the data may have otherwise been routinely deleted at the request of clients 
who are not parties to a litigation hold.  The subsequent release of the 
physical resource from the litigation hold may frustrate the routine business 
operations of other clients because their data will remain preserved.  These 
problems are further complicated when multiple Cloud providers service the 
same clients.  
                                                      
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Weitz, supra note 2. 
93 See Mell & Grance, supra note 5, at 1; see also Grandison, supra note 17. 
94 See Mell & Grance, supra note 5, at 1. 
95 Id. 
96 See Who Owns Metadata, supra note 87. 
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C. Identifying Who Controls Data 
¶33 The Rules require that a client produce ESI in its possession, 
custody, or control.  In Cloud Computing, it is a client’s “control” that is 
most difficult to define because Cloud providers are custodians of the ESI 
they hold in data centers.97  A client is deemed to have control over ESI “so 
long as the party has the legal right or ability to obtain the documents from 
another source upon demand.”98  Thus, clients may not have legal or actual 
control over common metadata that serves as key evidence.99  
¶34 The requirements imposed on Cloud providers under the Rules are 
ambiguous at best.  The Stored Communications Act (SCA) provides 
safeguards for clients against compelled disclosures imposed on Cloud 
providers.100  A client, however, will only benefit from the SCA “when a 
cloud provider expressly limits its access” to client data “for the purposes of 
providing computer storage or processing functions.”101  Inexperienced 
clients who allow Cloud providers access to their data “without specifying 
the limits of that authority” are generally not protected by the SCA.102  For 
example, clients of Gmail are probably not protected because Google 
reviews emails to provide client-specific contextual advertising.103 More 
generally, Cloud Computing clients may be disqualified from “seeking 
refuge from disclosure under the Act” when Cloud providers use a “service 
of retrieval” function “for using applications or data stored with the cloud 
provider” because this function permits Cloud providers to access client 
data content.104 
                                                      
97 See Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F.R.D. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) 
(indicating that “the test is control and not possession”); see also Am. Rock Salt 
Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 228 F.R.D. 426, 460 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Control [for 
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) purposes] is defined as ‘the legal right, authority, or ability 
to obtain upon demand documents in possession of another.’”) (quoting 
Florentia Contracting Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 11993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5275, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1993)). 
98 See Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 160 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
99 See Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. 08-05780, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
93517, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (asserting a claim by Facebook.com 
that another social network cannot make a copy of a user’s own data even if the 
user provides full permission). 
100 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 
201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711). 
101 See Robison, supra note 15, at 1222. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 1213. 
104 See Robison, supra note 15, at 1218–19; see also Flagg v. City of Detroit, 
252 F.R.D. 346, 358–59 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting the SCA requires the 
provider not be “‘authorized to access the contents of any such communications 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 008 
D. Increased Legal Risks  
¶35 Cloud Computing poses new challenges for litigants to avoid 
sanctions.105  The inadvertent deletion of ESI, under a litigation hold, by a 
routine operation of a Cloud provider or through actions from clients of the 
same provider may result in spoliation claims.106 It is unclear if the safe 
harbor provision107 of the Rules will apply when clients share operations of 
computer systems.  Even basic litigation holds may impose undue burdens 
and costs on a litigant or on multiple clients of a Cloud not associated with 
the matter.  
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD  
A. Contractual Relationships 
¶36 One key to mitigating risks associated with discovery in a Cloud is 
negotiating the terms of a service contract to define the legal rights of a 
provider and client.  Of course, this solution assumes equal bargaining 
power between a Cloud provider and client.108  While powerful entities may 
successfully negotiate favorable terms of a contract, smaller or 
inexperienced clients may be subject to one-sided agreements.109  For 
example, the city of Los Angeles negotiated a contract with Google to 
provide an email system for city employees.110  The contract included 
                                                                                                                         
for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer 
processing.’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2006)). 
105 See, e.g., Phillip M. Adams & Assocs. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 
1193 (D. Utah 2009) (finding sanctions were appropriate because the 
defendant’s “system architecture of questionable reliability which has evolved 
rather than been planned, operates to deny . . . access to evidence”); see also 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 215, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
106 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, 32 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-
2005.pdf (“[I]t can be very difficult to interrupt or suspend the routine operation 
of computer systems to isolate and preserve discrete parts of the information 
they overwrite, delete or update, on an ongoing basis, without creating 
problems.”). 
107 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (noting that shelter from sanctions for spoliation 
under the safe harbor provision of the Rules is available when ESI is lost due to 
the “routine, good faith” operation of computer systems). 
108 See DeVore, supra note 8, at 373. 
109 Id. 
110 David Sarno, Los Angeles Adopts Google e-mail System for 30,000 City 
Employees, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/10/city-council-votes-to-adopt-
google-email-system-for-30000-city-employees.html. 
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provisions where Google would “compensate the city in the event that the 
Google system was breached and city data exposed or stolen.”111  In 
contrast, the standard Gmail service contract with individual customers 
allows Google to access client information and email; it also notes that 
Google “processes personal information” on servers in the U.S. and in other 
countries.112   
¶37 Clients should also be cautious about using the services of smaller, 
less-expensive, competing Cloud providers who might lack the resources to 
properly accommodate discovery requests.  However, clients may have 
more bargaining power with smaller Cloud providers.  Still, clients ought to 
be aware that the providers will probably offer fewer reliable service 
features.    
¶38 A service contract should provide safeguards to protect clients from 
the inadvertent discovery of ESI and include procedural guidelines to 
facilitate the discovery process.  Provisions should delineate the types and 
amount of metadata routinely preserved in a designated repository and 
define client rights to access that metadata.  Provisions should ensure that 
clients remain protected under the SCA by preventing Cloud providers from 
unilaterally accessing, viewing, or providing client ESI to government 
agencies or other parties.113  A contract should, at least, require Cloud 
providers to notify clients in advance of accessing client ESI, which would 
allow clients time to secure privileged information.114  The contract should 
also impose restrictions on the location of data centers storing client ESI 
because the laws in some countries may trump U.S. security and privacy 
provisions.115  
B. Technical Solutions  
¶39 In addition to negotiating the terms of Cloud Computing services, 
there are several possible technical solutions.  First, a client may adopt a 
hybrid approach to storing data by which the majority of data is stored in a 
public Cloud and sensitive ESI is stored in a private Cloud.116  Of course, 
                                                      
111 Id. 
112 Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacy/privacy-policy.html.  
113 But see DeVore, supra note 8, at 372 (“Most Terms of Service allow the 
provider of the cloud service access to data, the ability to view data, and the 
ability to turn data over in the event that the Government or a third party asks for 
it.  Often that’s true without any notice to the consumer.”). 
114 See id.  
115 See Mills, supra note 35, at 7. 
116 See DeVore, supra note 8, at 373 (“[F]or truly sensitive and confidential 
information, think seriously before putting that information in the cloud at all in 
light of all the privacy and security issues that are arising.”). 
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this requires private infrastructure and remains limited to clients with 
greater financial resources.  A hybrid approach may also require redundant 
applications stored in different types of Clouds or require indexing and 
channeling of sensitive metadata into a private Cloud.   
¶40 Second, Cloud providers may consider developing an application 
that automatically isolates specified ESI and associated metadata when 
there is a litigation hold.  Cloud providers may then offer the application as 
an added service to clients.  A client may try to avoid sanctions by using 
this software program because its use demonstrates a good faith attempt to 
comply with the Rules.   
¶41 Third, Cloud providers may track metadata, especially when 
considering the possibility of replicating, moving, or losing metadata as 
clients migrate between Clouds to access ESI from remote locations, and 
through different devices.   
¶42 Finally, another solution may be to encrypt all ESI and metadata 
with client-specific keys such that the ESI, and metadata, remain 
indecipherable by other clients in case of an inadvertent production. 
C. Revising the Rules 
¶43 While negotiated contracts and technical changes may help 
individual clients, a universal solution requires amending the Rules.  The 
test for “possession, custody, or control”117 in the Rules requires a 
clarification of what degree of control distinguishes data subject to 
discovery in a shared environment.  “Control” should be limited to ESI, 
including metadata, over which a party has exclusive or substantial control.  
If “control” is not given such a circumscribed meaning, exceptions to the 
current liberal definition should exist to avoid the inadvertent production or 
destruction of ESI shared with other parties.  Further, the Rules should not 
allow discovery of physical storage volumes in a shared environment, or 
they should limit discovery only to virtual volumes.  If physical storage 
volumes remain discoverable, then Cloud providers should be required to 
provide fair notice to clients who may share the same resources. 
¶44 The Rules should provide better guidelines for distinguishing 
different types of ESI (e.g., user-specific and common metadata) and define 
the scope of production and preservation owed by parties in a Cloud.  The 
Rules should consider that clients may have limited control over key ESI 
and that Cloud providers control common metadata.  Furthermore, 
safeguards to prevent the risk of inadvertently preserving ESI belonging to 
other Cloud clients should be addressed by the Rules.  That is, they should 
provide for more procedural mechanisms than the mere ability to move for a 
                                                      
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
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protective order when clients are asked to produce metadata that is not 
reasonably accessible or results in undue burden and cost. There should be 
exceptions for reasonably accessible shared metadata that may unduly 
burden other clients. 
D. Immediate Measures 
¶45 Until the above remedies become commonplace and the Rules are 
amended, Cloud providers should devise procedural and usage guidelines to 
protect clients.  The guidelines should aid clients to demonstrate a good 
faith effort to comply with the Rules and facilitate the discovery process.  
They should provide safeguards for clients and mitigate risks of sanctions 
by preventing the destruction of ESI after a litigation hold issues.  To avoid 
claims of spoliation, a Cloud provider should provide a mechanism for 
gathering data fragmented across multiple data centers, isolating relevant 
data, and migrating that data to a repository where it will remain intact.  
Cloud providers should understand their roles as custodians of ESI they 
possess and outline instructions for their staff to respond to litigation holds. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶46 The Federal Rules of Discovery do not effectively apply to clients 
of a Cloud.  The shared nature of Cloud Computing requires limiting 
discovery to data in exclusive or substantial control by a client or whose 
discovery will not unduly harm other clients.  In anticipation of the 
universal adoption of Cloud Computing, the Rules should provide guidance 
and exceptions for particular types of shared ESI.  Meanwhile, clients 
should consider whether their service contracts include safeguards against 
inadvertent discoveries of data, indicate the costs for ongoing preservation, 
and provide mechanisms for complying with the duty to preserve and for 
securely applying and releasing litigation holds.118  Inaction will stifle the 
adoption of Cloud Computing and deny the public its positive network 
effects. 
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